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I. INTRODUCTION

On August 31, 2004, The World Trade Organization (WTO) issued
eight arbitration decisions1 against the United States on a piece of U.S.
legislation - the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
(CDSOA). 2 The decisions found that the CDSOA violated international
trade law, and authorized countries such as Brazil, Canada, Chile, the
European Union, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico to impose retaliatory
measures on imports from the United States. At the heart of the controversy
* J.D., with honor, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2004; L.L.B., University
of International Business & Economics, Beijing, China, 1991. The author wishes to thank the
editors of the Journalfor their work on this Article.
1. See, e.g., United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 Original Complaint by Brazil - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6
of the DSU- Decision by the Arbitrator, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (Aug. 31, 2004). Other Decisions
can be found on the WTO web site, at www.wto.org under WT/DS217/ARB/CHL, WT/DS217/
ARB/EEC, WT/DS217/ARB/IND, WT/DS217/ARB/JPN, WT/DS217/ARB/KOR [hereinafter
Decisions by the Arbitrator].
2. 114 Stat. 1549, PL 106-387, codified at 19 C.F.R. 159.61.
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is the CDSOA, or commonly known as the Byrd Amendment,3 which
directs the U.S. government to distribute the collected anti-dumping and
countervailing duties to the complaining U.S. companies who have filed
petitions.
The complainants in this dispute claimed that the Byrd Amendment
violated seven different anti-dumping, subsidy, and countervailing duty
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and by
distributing the tariff proceeds to domestic companies, the U.S.
government provided a subsidy to these companies that had already
received the benefits of a higher anti-dumping duty - a double protection
inconsistent with the WTO rules.4 The United States argued that the
distribution of tariff proceeds to affected domestic companies was an
"exercise of the intrinsic right" of a sovereign nation, and therefore was not
a violation of the WTO nor of the GATT agreements.'
In this controversy involving thirty countries directly and indirectly,
perhaps the largest in scale in the history of the WTO, the United States
lost in every phase of the battle. On September 16, 2002, The WTO
Dispute Resolution Panel (Panel) issued its decision against the United
States, and found that the CDSOA is inconsistent with the provisions ofthe
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, and thus nullifies or
impairs benefits accruing to the complaining parties under those
agreements. On appeal, the Appellate Body affirmed the findings of the
Panel and recommended a change or repeal of the Byrd Amendment to
bring the United States in conformity with its WTO obligations.' The
United States resorted to arbitration to challenge the Appellate Body's
ruling' but lost again. On June 13, 2003, the WTO arbitrators confirmed

3. The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 19 U.S.C. 1654 (1999 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter Byrd Amendment].
4. See United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Communities, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand, WT/DS217/5 (July 13, 2001) [hereinafter Panel Request
WT/DS217/5], availableat http://www.wto.org Document No. 01-3528.
5. See United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Appellant's
Submission of the United States of America, AB -2002-7 (Oct. 28, 2002), at 2, 5, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlement/W
TO/Dispute SettlementListings/assetuploadfile143_6484.pdf.
6. See United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Report of
the Panel - WT/DS217/R (Sept. 16, 2002).
7. See United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Appellate
Body Report and Panel Report- Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DS217/11 (Feb. 3,
2003).
8. See United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Request by
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
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the Appellate Body's decision and set the deadline of December 27, 2003
for the United States to amend or repeal the Byrd Amendment.9 The United
States failed to comply with that arbitration decision by the deadline.'" At
the requests of the eight complaining countries, on August 31, 2004, the
WTO issued its final arbitration decisions to authorize the complaining
countries to impose retaliatory measures against the United States. 1
There are no winners in this bitterly battled Byrd Amendment war.
Repealing the Byrd Amendment may expose the U.S. domestic producers,
especially the steel industry, to injuries from unfair foreign competition;
and more severely, the United States may not be ready for such a facelosing defeat before so many of its trade partners. Retaliations by these
trade partners, by the possible increase of the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty lawsuits from these countries, and the consequent
imposition of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties, will eventually
injure all U.S. exporters. More significantly, the noncompliance with the
WTO rulings by the world's number one trade power raises serious
questions about the viability of the WTO - an organization that has
played a vital role in the trade liberalization through out the history. 2
This Note discusses the controversy surrounding the Byrd Amendment
and its implications for the WTO and the trade relationship between the
United States and its trade partners. Part II will offer a brief overview of
the WTO anti-dumping and countervailing duty law. Part HI examines the
Byrd Amendment and the arguments for and against it. Part IV analyzes
the WTO rulings on the Byrd Amendment and Part V concludes.

Mexico and Thailand for Arbitration Under Article 21.39C) of the DSU, WT/DS217/12 (Mar. 19,
2003).
9. See United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Award of the
Arbitrator ARB-2003-1/16, WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22 (June 13, 2003).
10. Id.
11. See supra note 1.
12. The WTO's efforts to reduce trade barriers have contributed to total welfare of the world
economy and to economic prosperity in many of its 140 member countries. It is said that world
export levels are approximately 18 times higher today than they were in 1950 when the GATT first
took effect, and world GDP is 6 times higher. "The benefits of trade - including lower prices,
increased competition, greater innovation and increased productivity - clearly contributed to this
gain in world GDP." See Meredith Schutzman, Antidumping and the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: A Renewed Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1069 (2004)
(quoting Aaron Schavey, Avoid a Trade War Over U.S. Antidumping Measure (Jan. 26, 2001),
availableat http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandforeignaid/em713.cfm). See generallyJOHN
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1998);
CHARLES SAMPFORD ET AL., Living up to the Promisesof Global Trade, ch. 2.2, in THE WTO AND
THE DOHA ROUND, THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE (Ross P. Buckley ed., 2003).
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fI. THE WTO ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDIZATION REGIME
The WTO condemns and restricts unfair trade practices, which
generally take the form of dumping and subsidization. 3 Dumping is
generally condemned as an unfair means of competition and a distortion of
the basic foundation of international trade. 4 Dumping occurs when a
country exports a product at a price less than the "normal value," or at a
price below the production cost. 5 "Normal value" means the price charged
in the product's home market, or where there is no such home market, in
a third-country market. 16 As an exception to other GATT obligations, the
GATT authorizes an importing country to impose anti-dumping duties to
offset dumping if the dumping causes material injury to a domestic
industry. 7 Such anti-dumping duties are imposed based on the dumping
margin, which is the difference between the export price and the "normal
value" of the like products. 8 Although the concept of dumping is relatively
simple, extremely complex calculations are involved to adjust the factors
affecting the export price and the normal value to make the two prices
comparable.19
Since the promulgation of its first anti-dumping statutes in 1916, the
United States has generally implemented anti-dumping laws consistent
with the Article VI of GATT and the 1994 Agreement on Implementation

13. For a general background discussion of WTO and the unfair trade practices, including
anti-dumping and countervailing duties, see JACKSON, supra note 12; Mrrsuo MATUSHITA ET AL.,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (2002); STEPHEN D. COHEN ET
AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 150-182 (2d ed. 2003).
14. For discussions on the economics and policy issues of the anti-dumping laws, see ALAN
V. DEARDORFF, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND

PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989); WILLIAM
J. DAVEY, ANTIDUMPING LAWS: A TIME FOR RESTRICTION (1988).

15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, art. VI, § 1,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter

GATT].
16. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, art 2.2 [hereinafter WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement]. For a general discussion of antidumping laws, see JOHN JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (4th ed. 2002).

17. GATT, art. VI, § 2.
18. See JOHN H. JACKSON, Dumping in International Trade: Its Meaning and CGntext, in
ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supranote 14.

19. These factors include, inter alia,sales conditions such as transportation costs, amounts
for discounts and rebates, the general and administrative (G&A) expenses, interest expenses,
circumstances of sale (COS), level of trade (LOT) and currency conversion rate. For a basic
example of calculations on export price and normal value, see Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat
Products from India, 66 FED. REG. 22157 (May 3, 2001).
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of Article VI of GATT (WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement).2" Anti-dumping
administration in the United States is bifurcated between the International
Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) and the
International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITA initially determines
whether dumping has occurred by examining whether the imported goods
are sold in the United States at less than the "normal value."'" In the cases
involving market economies, the ITA uses the "home country price,"
which is the fair market value of a product or similar products sold in the
foreign firm's domestic market, to determine the normal value.2 2 Once the
ITA finds that dumping has occurred, it preliminarily establishes a
dumping margin by subtracting the normal value from the export price.2
The ITC next determines whether the U.S. industry has suffered
"material injury" as a result of dumping.24 For that purpose, the ITC sends
out questionnaires to U.S. companies in the industry to collect information
about injury or uses other information available.25 If the ITC's injury
determination is affirmative, the ITA, in turn, continues its preliminary
investigation about occurrence of dumping by sending out questionnaires
to all relevant parties, including foreign exporters and domestic importers.26
These questionnaires ask detailed questions about the prices and any
factors that could be used to adjust the prices to make export price and
home country price comparable.27 If the ITA determines, based on the
questionnaire responses,28 that dumping has occurred, the ITC will conduct
a further investigation on the injury issue. If the ITC confirms existence of
material injury, the ITA makes its final dumping determination and sets the
dumping margin. The ITA imposes anti-dumping duties accordingly.29

20. Uruguay Round Agreement Act, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., § 20134 (1994). The
current principle sources of U.S. anti-dumping law are the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 in which title VII are particularly relevant to anti-dumping actions. See
19 U.S.C. § 1673-73h; 1675-75a, 1677-77n, 1516a.
21. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A).
22. Id.
23. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(l)(A).
24. 19 C.F.R. pt. 207 (2001).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In the absence of adequate information from a particular respondent, the ITA uses the
"best information available" (BIA) to it for its dumping determination. Such BIA often involves
a more arbitrary surrogate country price.
29. See John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, Reform ofThe AdministrativeProceduresUsed
in US. Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Cases, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 399 (1992).
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A subsidy is an economic benefit conferred to the producer, but not
earned by such producer, to reduce the costs of production. It is considered
a distortion of an import's price and an unfair trading practice because
there is a disadvantage to producers of unsubsidized domestic products.30
A remedy for a subsidy is known as a "countervailing" duty, which is "a
duty imposed on imports to offset the advantage to foreign producers
derived from a subsidy that their government offers for the production or
export of the article taxed."3
The subject of subsidies is addressed in Article XVI of the GATT 1994,
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM
Agreement).32 Article XVI of GATT contains two key obligations: one
obligation prohibits using an export subsidy on primary products which
results in obtaining more than "an equitable share of world export trade in
that product;" a second obligation prohibits a subsidy on the export of nonprimary products which results in an export price lower than the
comparable price for like goods which are not exported.33 Article XVI of
GATT also contains an "illustrative list" of practices that would be
considered as "export subsidies. 34
In the United States, similar to the anti-dumping system, the antisubsidization investigations are conducted by the ITA and the ITC to
determine whether subsidization occurred and if such subsidization caused
a material injury to a U.S. industry. If both the ITA and the ITC make the
affirmative final determination, a countervailing duty is imposed on the
imported foreign products.
Both the anti-dumping and the countervailing duty are grounded on the
rationale of leveling the playing field in the domestic market by offsetting
unfair foreign trade practices.35 Over the years, the United States has
aggressively used the anti-dumping and the countervailing duties to protect
its domestic industries.36 At the beginning of 2000, the United States
maintained 267 anti-dumping/countervailing orders, the most of any

30. See MATUSHIrTA ET AL., supra note 13, at 260-61; Decisions by the Arbitrator, supra
note 1.
31. Id. at 262. Some scholars argue that the economic rationale for a countervailing duty is
doubtful at best because the effect of a countervailing duty is to make the product more expensive
for consumers in the importing country. Id.
32. For a general discussion of subsidization and countervailing duty law, see JACKSON ET
AL., supra note 16, at 767-77.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 150-82

(2d ed. 2003).
36. Id.
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country.3 7 Prior to the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, both antidumping and countervailing duties collected were paid into the U.S.
Treasury with a purpose to abate the costs associated with conducting
investigations with respect to the practices. 8 According to the projection
of the Congressional Budget Office, the federal receipts of anti-dumping
and countervailing duties will total $2.35 billion from 2005 through 2009
and $3.85 billion from 2005 through 2014.39
Il. THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND THE DEBATES
The Byrd Amendment was enacted on October 28, 2000 as a part of the
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act.40 Ordinarily, trade matters such as
anti-dumping and subsidy are within the expertise and jurisdiction of the
Senate Finance Committee. Because the Byrd Amendment never garnered
enough support in the Committee to make it to the floor for a vote,
Democratic Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia surreptitiously inserted
the language of the Byrd Amendment into the $80 billion agriculture
appropriations bill.4'
The Byrd Amendment essentially distributes the collected anti-dumping
and countervailing duties to "the companies that the duties are designed to
' The Act, in its pertinent part, states:
protect."42
Duties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order, an
antidumping duty order, or a finding under the Antidumping Act of
1921, shall be distributed on an annual basis under this section

37. See Congressional Budget Office, Economic Analysis of the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, at 3 (Mar. 2, 2004), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?
index=5130.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c.
41. The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act extended the dairy price support program and provided for direct
market loss payments to American farmers, funded the export loan program of the Commodity
Credit Corporation, and eased sanctions on food and medicine for Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and
Sudan. See id. Some suggests that by inserting the CDSOA surreptitiously into the agricultural
appropriation bill, Senator Byrd violated the congressional procedure rules that spending bills be
considered by each body's appropriate committee of expertise before going to conference. See
Claire Hervey, Note, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Politics at the WTO, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 131, at 148.

42. See supra text accompanying note 41.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

7

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5

424

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17

(Section 754, 19 U.S.C. 1675c) to the affected domestic producers
for qualifying expenditures. Such distribution shall be known as
"the continued dumping and subsidy offset." ' 3
The Byrd Amendment covers "affected domestic producers" which include
any businesses, persons, or interested parties who petition for the antidumping or countervailing duty.' "Qualifying expenditures" are expenses
incurred by the affected producers, including manufacturing facilities,
equipment, research, and development.45
The Byrd Amendment was enacted with an intent to "level the playing
field." ' As the Congress noted, the purpose of U.S. unfair trade laws is to
restore the conditions of fair trade in or that economic investment
and jobs that should be in the United States are not lost as a result
of disingenuous market signals; and if foreign subsidization or
dumping persists, U.S. producers will be hesitant to rehire
employees that were laid off in order to survive and may be
incapable of maintaining pension or health care benefits.47
The Byrd Amendment was thus intended to be compensatory in nature for
those victims of foreign dumping and subsidy.4 8
Since the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, U.S. companies flocked
to the U.S. Customs Service to get the money. The Service disbursed a
total amount of $231 million in fiscal year 2001 and $330 million in 2002.
However, those amounts met only a small portion of the total disbursement
sought by the domestic companies.
In 2001, there were 894 separate claims
49
seeking a total of $1.2 trillion!
The Byrd Amendment was controversial domestically since its
enactment. Aware of the inconsistency of the Byrd Amendment with the
WTO commitments, President Clinton, in his signature statement, urged
Congress to override this provision the Byrd Amendment or amend it to be

43. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (Historical & Statutory Notes - Findings of Congress Respecting Continued
Dumping and Subsidy) (1999 & Supp. 2002).
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c.
49. See Dan Ikenson, "Byrdening" Relations: US. Trade Policies Continue to Flout the
Rules, 5 FREETRADEBULL., Jan. 13,2004, available athttp://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB005.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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acceptable. ° The statement pointed out that the provision would provide
certain domestic industries with a subsidy above and beyond the protection
level needed to counteract foreign subsidies, while providing no
comparable subsidy to other U.S. industries or U.S. consumers, who are
forced to pay higher prices on goods as a result of the anti-dumping and
countervailing duties.5
The strongest argument in opposition to the Byrd Amendment is that
the distribution of duties under the Amendment affords a double remedy
to the affected domestic producers, because these producers have already
been protected by the imposition of high anti-dumping and countervailing
duties toward foreign products and thus have reaped benefits from it.5" The
Byrd Amendment is seen by the opponents as subsidization - a form of
anticompetitive practice condemned by the WTO agreements. 3 The effect
was illustrated by evidence presented to the Panel by Canada: A U.S.
producer solicited supports from other producers for a proposed
countervailing application because a very large amount of funds is
available for these producers. In another instance, U.S. producers which
had initially admitted lack of injury later "changed its mind" and expressed
support for the litigation in order to be eligible for offset payment
subsidies. 4
Opponents also argue that the Byrd Amendment creates an
inappropriate incentive to bring anti-dumping and countervailing duty
cases. 5 Despite the Byrd Amendment's proscription of the criteria of the
"affected domestic producer" and the "qualifying expenditures," the

50. Statement by the President: H.R. 4661, The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriates Act for FY 2001 (Oct. 28, 2000),
available at http://www.ebearing.com/legislation/agri-statement-2000.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2005).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Panel Request WT/DS217/5, supra note 4. Specifically, the countries argue that
Section 1.l(a)(1)(I) of the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as a "financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member, where a government practice
involves a direct transfer of funds, potential transfers of funds or liabilities." Because the Byrd
Amendment confers a direct financial benefit on private U.S. producers, the amendment falls within
the purview of the SCM Agreement, which restricts any WTO members from implementing
subsidies that have adverse effects on the welfare of other members. Id.
54. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act - Report of the Panel, WT/DS217R,
WT/DS234R, at 311 (Sept. 16,2002) [hereinafter Panel Report], availableat http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispue/217_234r-a-e.pdf.
55. See Schutzman, supranote 12, at 1083; Hale E. Sheppard, The ContinuedDumping and
Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment): A Defeat Before the WTO May Constitute an Overall
Victory For US. Trade, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 121, 129 (2002).
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Amendment fails to expressly mandate how the disbursements of the duties
are to be used by the recipients. 6 Such statutory silence regarding
expenditures may serve as an incentive for U.S. producers to initiate
additional anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions, "both unfounded
and meritorious, 57 even in less egregious instances of dumping and
subsidization. 8
Some commentators question the legitimacy of the Byrd Amendment
due to the dubious manner in which it was enacted. 9 The Byrd
Amendment was not enacted in accordance with standard procedures,
which requires a bill of this nature to be subject to intense congressional
debate and scrutiny. 6° Instead, the Amendment was silently inserted into a
bill unrelated to trade in conference without a vote in either the House or
the Senate, 6 ' and was adopted "in a manner that intentionally circumvented
standard congressional procedures." 62 Thus, opponents complained that the
legislative maneuvering of the Amendment "has created an irremediable
appearance of impropriety, a taint that will undermine its legitimacy both
in the United States and internationally."63
56. See supra text accompanying note 55.
57. See Sheppard, supra note 55, at 129.
58. Other critics argue in opposition to the Byrd Amendment from a different prospective.
Some claim that the Byrd Amendment distorts the calculation of domestic industry support
necessary to establish a petitioner's standing to bring an anti-dumping or countervailing duty case,
because only supporters of the petition are eligible for Byrd Amendment distributions. See Kevin
M. Dempsey, The WTO Ruling on The Byrd Amendment - Another Case of Overreaching by the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, Remarks Before the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 6 (Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/byrd.
amendmentpanel_presentation.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). One commentator argued that the
Byrd Amendment will lead to economic losses for the U.S. government, because the duties that the
Treasury Department collected to cover the expenses incurred by the U.S. government in
administering the unfair trade laws are channeled out to the affected domestic producers, and thus
the government is deprived of approximately $200 million annually. See Sheppard, supranote 55,
at 133.
59. See Sheppard, supra note 55, at 139.
60. See Hervey, supra note 41.
61. As noted earlier in the text, the Byrd Amendment was inserted as a subsection of the
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2001. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
62. See Sheppard, supranote 55, at 140-41 (quoting Letter from Jon E. Jenson, Consuming
Industries Trade Action Coalition, to Senator Trent Lott (Oct. 27, 2000)).
63. See Sheppard, supra note 55, at 141. Sheppard observed that proponents of the Byrd
Amendment in Congress were well aware of the fact that, for more than two decades, congressional
attempts to enact a law like the Byrd Amendment had been rejected after intense debate in
Congress. The hasty, secret introduction of the Byrd Amendment into the agriculture bill only
caused confusion and failed to enable the legislators to fully understand the true implication of the
bill.
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Proponents of the Byrd Amendment invoke the notion of fairness and
justice to justify the Amendment. Many express the view that it is a
country's sovereign right to decide how its duties are collected and used.'
The Byrd Amendment is characterized by Congress as a "victim's
compensation fund" for petitioners in the anti-dumping and countervailing
duty cases who have proved themselves to have been injured by the foreign
unfair trade practices.65
IV. THE BATTLE IN THE WTO

On December 22, 2000, shortly after the enactment of the Byrd
Amendment, nine countries filed a joint complaint for consultations with
the WTO.66 When the consultations failed, the participating countries filed
a request for the establishment of a panel and formally filed suit against the
United States. 67 The countries claimed that the Byrd Amendment violated
rules of the GATT 1994,68 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the GATT 1994 (AD Agreement), Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh Agreement).69 On
64. See id at 127.
65. Senator John Spratt (D-SC) defended the Byrd Amendment and said that "the principle
is basic: the companies directly harmed should be made as nearly whole as possible. If we are going
to shield companies and their workers from dumping, this needs to be part of the remedy." Press
Release, U.S. Rep. John Spratt (D-SC), Rep. Spratt Criticizes WTO Decision on Anti-Dumping
Remedy, Calls on Administration to Strike Back (Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Spratt Press Release],
availableat http://www.house.gov/spratt/news-archive/03_04/wtodecision.pdf(last visited Apr.
6, 2005). Some believed that the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws give insufficient
protection to vulnerable U.S. industries faced with unfair competitions from abroad, because antidumping and countervailing proceedings take too long for the injured domestic producers to have
the chance to recover from the lost market position. See Adam C. Hawkins, Antidumping Beyond
the GA TT 1994: Supporting InternationalEnactment of Legislation Providing Supplemental
Remedies, 10 IND. INT'L &COMP. L. REv. 149, 167 (1999).
66. The first stage of the WTO dispute resolution process is request for consultation. See
WTO, Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 4 [hereinafter DSU]; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 16,
at 259. Article 4 of the DSU provides that consultations are to be entered into in good faith and are
to be held within 30 days of a request. If consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after
the request therefore, the complaining party may request the establishment of a penal, which is
equal to filing a complaint in a court system. Id.
67. See supra text accompanying note 53.
68. The complaint was filed by eleven WTO members: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the
European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand. Five other
countries or regions joined as third parties to support the complaint: Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong
Kong (China), Israel, and Norway.
69. See Panel Report, supratext accompanying note 54.
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September 12, 2002, the WTO issued a Panel Report (Panel) and found
that the Byrd Amendment was inconsistent with the provisions of these
agreements.7" The Panel found that the Byrd Amendment constituted an
impermissible specific action against dumping and subsidization under the
Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreement.7" The Panel further found that the
Byrd Amendment "provides specific subsidies as defined under Article
2.1 (a) [of the SCM Agreement] because it explicitly limits access to the
subsidy to certain enterprises, that is, the group of manufacturers,
producers, farmers, ranchers, or worker representatives that were
petitioners in support of an anti-dumping duty order or finding or a
countervailing duty order. 7 2 By this holding, the Panel supported the
argument of the complaining countries that the Byrd Amendment provides
an incentive to file or support petitions for anti-dumping or anti-subsidy
measures, thereby distorting the application of the standing requirements
provided for in the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement in violation
of Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement and Article 11.4 of the SCM
Agreement.73 The Panel
Report recommended that the United States repeal
74
the Byrd Amendment.
The United States promptly appealed to the WTO Appellate Body on
October 18, 2002. The central issue on appeal was whether the Byrd
Amendment violated the AD Agreement and the SCM as a "nonpermissible, specific action against dumping or subsidy. 7 5 The United
States argued that Byrd Amendment was consistent with Article 18.1 of the
AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.76 These
provisions set forth the scope of permissible remedies.77 Specifically,
Article 18.1 of the AD Agreement provides that no specific action against
dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this
Agreement. 7' Article 18.1 further clarifies in its footnote that it does not

70. Panel Report, supra note 54.
71. Id. at313.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 316.
74. Id.
75. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, at 1 (Jan. 16,2003) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Art. 18.1 (1994), availableathttp://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/I 9-adp.pdf.
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preclude action under other relevant WTO agreements.79 Article 32.1 of the
SCM Agreement uses the same language except that the words "dumping
of exports from" are replaced by "a subsidy of."8 The United States argued
that the Byrd Amendment is a permissible "specific action against"
dumping or subsidy, and therefore is consistent with the WTO
agreements.8 '
Four other issues were also raised on appeal. The first issue raised was
whether the United States acted in good faith in enacting the Byrd
Amendment.8 2 The second issue argued was whether the Byrd Amendment
violated the WTO Agreement.8 3 The third argument was whether the Byrd
Amendment "nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to the complaining
parties. ' 84 The fourth issue was whether the United States should have
received a separate Dispute Resolution Panel report on the claim brought
by Mexico. 5
The Appellate Body upheld all of the holdings of the Panel except for
the good faith issue and again found that the Byrd Amendment constitutes
a non-permissible specific action against dumping and subsidization, in
violation of Article 18.1 ofthe AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM
Agreement, respectively.86 In its reasoning, the Appellate Body adopted a
textual interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "impermissible specific
action against dumping or a subsidy."87 On the "specific action" test, the
Appellate Body held that the Byrd Amendment is a specific action because
the money distribution under the Amendment is "inextricably linked to,
and strongly correlated with" a determination of dumping or
subsidization.8 8 The Appellate Body explained that although a finding of
dumping or subsidy is not explicit in the text of the Byrd Amendment, such
a finding is absolutely necessary for the Byrd Amendment to be applied for
three reasons.89 This is because first the offset payments could be made
only after anti-dumping or countervailing duty had been collected, second,
these duties could be collected only pursuant to an anti-dumping or

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 223(b).
See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI,
Id. 223(d).
Id. 223(e).
Appellate Body Report, supra note 75.
Id.
Id. 242.
Id.
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countervailing duty order, and third, an order could be made only after a
determination of dumping or subsidization.9"
As for the meaning of "against" dumping or subsidization, the
Appellate Body used the "adverse bearing" test, explaining that duties
colleted in an anti-dumping or countervailing case are "against" dumping
or subsidization if they have a direct or indirect "adverse bearing on
dumping or subsidization."91 The United States argued that the
lexicographic meaning of "against" should be "in contact with," and thus
the Byrd Amendment is not against dumping or subsidization because the
duties collected do not operate directly on the imported good or its
producer, but instead on the "practice of dumping,"92 and the funds are
distributed to the victimized domestic producer, not directly transferred
from the foreign producer to the U.S. petitioner.93 The Appellate Body was
not persuaded.94 The Appellate Body held that the word "against" meant
that a measure has an adverse bearing on the practice of dumping or
subsidization that dissuades these practices or creates an incentive to
terminate them.9 5 The Appellate Body found that the Byrd Amendment has
exactly these effects, because the Amendment channels a transfer of
financial resources from a producer or exporter of dumped or subsidized
merchandise to the domestic competitor of that merchandise.96 The offset
payments come from the collected duties that are ultimately paid by foreign
producers.97 Furthermore, the Byrd Amendment requires the offset
payment to be spent on a "qualifying expenditure," which is related to the
production of the same product that is the subject of the anti-dumping or
countervailing order.9" Lastly, the United States affected producers may use
the funds to improve their competitive position relative to their foreign
competitors whose products are subject to an anti-dumping or
countervailing order.99
Having concluded that the Byrd Amendment is a "specific action
against dumping or subsidization" within the meaning of the AntiDumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body next
examined whether the distribution of the duties under the Byrd

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 75, 247.
Id. 251.
Id.
See generally id
Id.
See generally Appellate Body Report, supra note 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Amendment is a "permissible" action against dumping and subsidy.' The
Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's holding and its reasoning that it
was impermissible.' The WTO rules allow only three categories of
actions a country may take in response to dumping: anti-dumping duties,
provisional measures,1 1 2 and price undertaking." 3 With respect to
subsidization, the permissible actions include only countervailing duties,
provisional measures, price undertakings," °4 and certain multilaterally
sanctioned countermeasures.'0 5 The Appellate Body found that the
distribution of duties under the Byrd Amendment does not fall within any
of these categories.'0 6 Therefore, the Byrd Amendment is an
"impermissible" specific action against dumping and a subsidy.0 7 The
Appellate Body recommended that the United States bring the Byrd
Amendment 8into conformity with its obligations under the WTO
agreements. 10
Based on the rules of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), a decision by the Appellate Body is the final ruling and is not
subject to further appeal.10 9 However, although the Uruguay Round
negotiations resulted in a more realistic and stronger enforcement
mechanism, the WTO does not have enforcement power after all.'
Enforcement is maintained by the voluntary compliance with the WTO
Agreements by the members, and the retaliatory measures authorized by

100. Id.
101. See generally Appellant Body Report, supranote 75.
102. WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement art. 7. The AD Agreement authorizes an importing
country to take provisional measures in anticipation of the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, but
only after making a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and determining that
provisional measures are necessary to prevent damage that may occur during the period of
investigation.
103. WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement art. 8. The AD Agreement permits a "price undertaking"
whereby an exporter subject to an anti-dumping investigation offers a price undertaking to the
national anti-dumping authority to the effect that there would be an increase of export price to
eliminate the dumping margin or otherwise cease the alleged dumping. The national anti-dumping
authorities may accept the offer of price undertaking only after making an affirmative preliminary
determination of dumping and injury caused by such dumping. AD Agreement art. 8.2. If the antidumping authority determines that there is neither injury nor threat thereof, the price undertaking
will have no effect.
104. SCM Agreement art. 23.
105. Id. art. 20.
106. See generally Appellate Body Report, supra note 75.
107. Id.
108. Id. 1319.
109. See JACKSON ETAL., supra note 16, at 264-65.

110. See id.
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the agreements. "' The Appellate Body's decision on Byrd Amendment left
the United States with two options: repeal the Byrd Amendment or face
retaliations from its major trade partners." 2
The complaining parties rejoiced over their victory." 3 On January 16,
2003, the same day when the Appellate Body rendered its final decision,
the European Union issued a press release, urging the United States to
comply." 4 The statement quoted EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy,
The EU and 10 other countries had maintained that this measure
clearly flies in the face of the letter and the spirit of WTO law. This
was our conviction from the outset and I am glad that the Appellate
Body has not clearly and definitively condemned this measure. We
now expect the U.S. to act quickly in order to repeal the Byrd
Amendment." 5
Lamy urged the United States to "play by the rules" and warned that
"noncompliance weakens a system which enforces America's own
rights.,,11 6 The WTO officials also voiced concerns that the ruling will not
be honored by the United States." 7 Japan indicated that if the United States
refuses to repeal the Byrd Amendment, Japan will ask the WTO to approve
specific retaliatory measures as soon as possible." 8 Canada went a step
further and circulated a proposal for refund of the Byrd Amendment
duties. 119
Inside Washington D.C., the battle was far from over. Although
President Bush supported the repeal of Byrd Amendment, the Senate

111. Seeid.
112. Appellate Body Report, supranote 75.
113. See Press Release, European Union, WTO Appellate Body Condemns the "Byrd
Amendment" the U.S. Must Now Repeal It, (Jan. 13, 2003), available at http://www.eurunion.
org/news/press/2003/2003003.htm (last visited on Apr. 6, 2005).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Pascal Lamy, Come on America, Play by the Rules!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2003, at A16.
In his article, Lamy expressed concerns that "if we, the elephants of world trade, don't follow the
rules of the road, we weaken our ability to get others to do so."
117. Rossella Brevetti, WTO Official Cites Rising Concern With U.S. 'Ability to Comply With
Adverse WTO Rulings, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 303 (2003).
118. CalTrade Report, Fight's Over: WTO RulesAgainst "ByrdAmendment" (Aug. 31,2004),
availableathttp://www.caltradereport.com/eWebPages/front-page-1094031264.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2005).
119. Daniel Pruzin, CanadaUrges Refund ofIllegal Duties as Partof WTO Reform ofAD/CV
Rules, 20 INT'L TRADE REP (BNA), at 264 (2003).
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"seems to have drawn a line in the sand over this issue.""12 Less than a
month after the Appellate Body's final decision, sixty-nine senators signed
a letter to President Bush opposing the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.121
One senator expressed that the Appellate Body's ruling was "a clear
example of overreaching by the WTO" and threatened not to close the
Doha round until the issue is "resolved to our satisfaction.' ' 122 Another
senator said, "In the end, this decision may not matter much,
as I suspect
' 23
there is little support in Congress for implementing it.'

In the midst of the political defiance in Washington of the WTO ruling,
proponents of the Byrd Amendment vocally criticized the Appellate
Body's final ruling. 24 Critics argue that the biggest flaw in the WTO's
ruling is its improper interpretation of the permissible subsidy under the
WTO agreements.' 25 A subsidy granted in one country that causes injury
in another is not prohibited under the WTO rules, and imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on the dumped and subsidized goods
are specifically authorized by the WTO agreements. 126 The Byrd
Amendment merely directs payments made out of the revenues lawfully
collected from the duties to the domestic producers, and it does not affect

120. For an overview ofhow the Byrd Amendment controversy developed domestically in the
United States, see Ikenson, supra note 49.
121. Spratt Press Release, supra note 65.
122. Id.
123. See U.S. Faces WTO Pressure to Repeal Trade Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003
(Remarks by Senator Max Baucus of Montana in response to the WTO finding on Byrd
Amendment in January 2003).
124. Id.
125. The SCM Agreement used the "traffic light" approach in categorizing the subsidy defined
in the agreement. Part II, III, and IV establish three kinds of subsidies: (1) prohibited subsidies (red
light); (2) actionable subsidies (yellow light); and (3) nonactionable subsidies (green light). The
prohibited subsidies are forbidden per se. Article 3 of the SCM Agreement lists the kinds of
prohibited subsidies to include subsidies contingent on export performance and contingent on the
use of domestic over imported goods. Annex I to the SCM Agreement contains a non-exhaustive
list of Export Subsidies. Actionable subsidies must meet two conditions: (1) the scheme must
represent a financial assistance by the government, confer a benefit to a recipient and be specific;
and (2) the subsidy must not constitute either a prohibited subsidy or a nonactionable subsidy. In
addition, the actionable subsidy must cause "adverse effects" to the interests of other WTO
members. The term "adverse effects" is defined as (1) injury to the domestic industry of another
WTO member; (2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to other WTO member(s); or
(3) serious prejudice to the interests of another WTO member. SCM Agreement art 5.
Nonactionable subsidies are those "nonactionable" during the first five years of the WTO: (1)
research and development subsidies; (2) subsidies to disadvantaged regions; and (3) environmental
subsidies. SCM Agreement art 8.1, 8.2.
126. See generally id.
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the imported products or the foreign producers of those products.'27 The
Appellate Body found that the Byrd Amendment imposes an additional
burden on the foreign producer/exporter because it "effects a transfer of
financial resources from the producers/exporters of dumped or subsidized
goods to their domestic competitors" because the payments are made from
anti-dumping or countervailing duties "paid by the foreign
producers/exporters."' 28 But the reality is, critics argue, that the duties are
paid by the importers, not by the foreign producers, and so there is "in fact
no transfer of financial resources."' 29 In rebutting the common opposition
to the Byrd Amendment that it affords double protection to the U.S.
domestic producers, commentators argue that "any antidumping or
countervailing duty relief is prospective only, and generally goes into effect
only after the affected domestic industry has suffered several years of
injury in the form of lost market share, operating losses, and the like."'"3
Proponents of the Byrd Amendment also question the validity of the
proposition that the Amendment encourages anti-dumping or
countervailing duty litigation.' They point out that anti-dumping and
countervailing duty cases are complicated in nature and expensive to
litigate.'32 Even if petitioners succeed in the proceedings, it can be several
years before any funds are available for distribution under the
Amendment. 33 Therefore, it would be "foolhardy to bring a case just
in the
134
day."'
the
of
end
the
at
money
Amendment
Byrd
getting
hopes of
Weathering the improbability of repealing the Byrd Amendment by the
U.S. legislation, as called for in the Appellate Body's final ruling, and after
the deadline of December 23, 2003 had passed for the United States to
repeal the amendment, the winning countries resorted to the WTO again
for authorization to impose retaliatory sanctions for the noncompliance of
the United States. 135 WTO Arbitration ensued pursuant to Article 22.6 of
the DSU. 136 On August 31, 2004, the Decisions by the Arbitrators were
issued, upholding the Appellate Body's Report and authorizing the winning
parties to take retaliatory measures. 137 In determining the level of

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Dempsey, supranote 58, at 3.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 75, 254.
See Dempsey, supranote 58, at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dempsey, supranote 58, at 6.
Decisions by the Arbitrator, supra note 1.
Id.
See Decisions by the Arbitrator, supra note 1.
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retaliation, the WTO arbitrators calculate the level of the additional import
duty or other countermeasures based on the amount of payment disbursed
to the U.S. industry in the latest annual distribution.' Specifically, the
authorized level of retaliation is based on the trade effects of the most
recent payments distributed from anti-dumping or countervailing duties
collected on the products originating from each WTO Member.' 39
Therefore, the payments will be multiplied by a factor of 0.72, which is
based on an economic model developed by the arbitrator to determine such
trade effects.' The arbitrators also ruled that the level of sanctions may
vary from year to year so as to reflect the wide variations in the amount of
payments made under the Byrd Amendment from one year to another.14
There are generally two sanctions under the WTO rules when the
recommendations and rulings of a WTO dispute settlement body are not
implemented within a reasonable time: the first kind of sanctions are
compensation and the second form of sanctions are retaliation (or, in the
jargon of WTO agreements, suspension of concessions). 4 2 Because
compensation is voluntary and subject to agreement between the parties to
the dispute, it is less often invoked.'43 Retaliation is deemed as a more
severe sanction.' The level of retaliation authorized by the Dispute
Settlement Body must be equivalent to the nullification or impairment to
the rights of the retaliating parties."' Retaliation is temporary and will be
terminated once the inconsistent measure has been removed, the losing
party has provided a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits,
or the parties have reached a satisfactory solution.'46

138. See, e.g., United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 Original Complaint by Brazil - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6
of the DSU - Decision by the Arbitrator, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, at 47 (Aug. 31, 2004).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. Original Complaint by Brazil, 3.146, 5.2.
141. Id. 5.3.
142. WTO, DSU art. 22.2. See generally MATUSHrrA ET AL., supra note 13, at 32; JACKSON
ET AL., supra note 16, at 305. Retaliation is often viewed as a questionable measure of unfair trade
remedy, not conforming to the obligations the WTO members promised under the WTO
Agreements. Furthermore, even if reciprocal retaliation is allowed by the DSU, the limitation of
suspension of concessions or obligations "equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment"
builds into the WTO a "considerable asymmetry of compensatory/suspension activity among
different members. A small member will notice that its activity of this type is not likely to have
much effect on a large member." JACKSON, supra note 12, at 96.
143. See supratext accompanying note 142.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. DSU art. 22.8.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS RETALIATION OR REPEAL?

What could the U.S. trade partners do to retaliate? Most directly, the
complaining countries may impose higher tariff rates to the level to offset
the benefits the U.S. industries received from the Byrd Amendment
disbursement. 4 7 Tariff imposition and collection is within a nation's
sovereignty, and unlike other protective measures condemned by the WTO,
it is permitted and even preferred by the WTO rules. 4
Another possible retaliation by the complaining countries would be to
enact domestic laws in these countries that are identical to the Byrd
Amendment, thereby leveling off the benefits the U.S. producers
received.' 49 Furthermore, the complaining countries may implement and
enforce their own anti-dumping and countervailing laws and increase the
frequency of litigation against the United States based on those laws. 50
147. So far, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico have already imposed retaliatory
tariffs. Starting from May 2005, Canada and the European Union each levied 15% tarriffs on
various goods imported from the United States. See Canada and EU Hit U.S. with Retaliatory
Tariffs, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (May 2, 2005), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2005/05/01/business/byrd.php. In August 2005, Japan announced that it would impose a tariffworth
over $50 million on U.S. steel imports. See Japan Enacts Tit-For-Tat Tariff on US Steel, ASIAN
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2005), availableat http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GH03DhOl.html.
148. Some argue that tariffs are
more visible, capture for the government much of the "monopoly profit" which
they create, do not need licensing to administer, do not require government funds
(in contrast to a subsidy), and give only a limited amount of protection, so that if
a foreign based industry is efficient enough, it will still be able to export to the
tariff-imposing country.
See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 343. Under GATT, as long as a country has not agreed to
a limit on its tariff for a particular product, it is generally allowed by the GATI"rules to impose any
level of tariff it sees fit. See GATI art II.
149. Interestingly, Greg Mastel, a trade adviser for a Washington law firm and former counsel
to the Senate Finance Committee, reportedly suggested that the complaining countries should
consider adopting their own versions of the Byrd Amendment as an alternative to U.S. repeal. See
Ikenson, supra note 49.
150. See Sheppard, supra note 55, at 150 (quoting the statement by Jack Porter in the
Congressional Record that "imposing higher duties on foreign imports or providing any other
special relief to a U.S. industry would occasion prompt swift retaliatory action by our trading
partners against a wide range of U.S. exports, including farm commodities and manufactured
products... construction equipment, airplanes, automotive parts, and computers.") With respect
to foreign anti-dumping and countervailing litigations against the United States, it is said that
developing countries, especially Latin American countries are increasingly using anti-dumping and
countervailing duty as weapons to strategically retaliate the traditional users of unfair trade laws
such as the United States. Id. at 152. For an introduction of the trade remedy laws in various
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The direct consequence of these retaliatory measures is the higher costs
for U.S. products driven by the increased tariffs. 5' U.S. manufacturers and
exporters would be less competitive in the markets of the retaliating
nations, all of which are major trade partners of the United States.' 52 The
effect would be felt domestically by trade deficits and job losses.'53
Globally, large scale tariff retaliations run afoul of the GATT and WTO
spirit and do much destruction to the WTO regime.'54 After all the GATT
and WTO system is premised upon its members' reciprocal promises and
ongoing negotiations to reduce tariff and liberalize trade.'55
Despite the oppositions from the U.S. Congress, the Bush
Administration seems to be standing by its position to repeal the Byrd
Amendment.' 56 On February 7, 2005, the Administration proposed repeal
of the Byrd Amendment in its budget proposal for fiscal year 2006.1' In
September 2005, an appropriations legislation amendment was filed in the
Senate to prohibit the distribution of the Byrd Amendment funds unless
distribution of such funds would not be inconsistent with U.S. WTO
obligations. 58
Repealing the Byrd Amendment may not seem to be as painful to the
welfare of the United States as some congressmen had imagined. The Byrd
Amendment was introduced primarily to mitigate the costs for the U.S.
steel industry in brining unfair trade litigation."' However, the benefits

countries, including Latin American countries, see THE COMPENDIUM OF FOREIGN TRADE REMEDY
LAWS (Leonard E. Santos ed., 1998).
151. See supra text accompanying note 150.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Tariff limitation and reduction are the central obligations of the GATT and the WTO.
GATT and WTO members mutually agree to limit their tariffs on particular goods to a specific
maximum. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 16, § 8.2, at 343-57. It took eight major rounds of
negotiation and more than half a century to research the current level of tariff commitments or
"bindings." See id. at 349.
156. See id.
157. See id
158. See StatusReport RegardingImplementationoftheDSB Recommendations andRulings
in the Disputes United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/16/Add.21, WT/DS234/24/Add.21 (Oct. 7, 2005). It remains to be seen whether the
proposal to repeal the Byrd Amendment will eventually pass the U.S. legislation.
159. Senator Robert Byrd has openly stated that the U.S. trade policies "have been influenced
far too heavily by diplomatic interests and concern for the welfare of our trading partners. Too little
consideration has been given to domestic needs and the jobs of Americans... West Virginia is
feeling the pinch of ill-conceived trade policies." Press Release, Senator Robert C. Byrd, Free
Trade- Fair Trade, Byrd's-Eye View (Feb. 10, 1999), quoted in Sheppard, supranote 55, n. 109.
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brought to certain industries by the Byrd Amendment are realized to the
detriment of certain other industries, consumers and the overall U.S.
economy, as the retaliation and protective measures by U.S. trade partners
build up and trade wars escalate. 6 ' On the international front, refusal to
honor the WTO rulings and repeal the Byrd Amendment makes it difficult
for the United States to persuade other countries, including the developing
countries, to abide by the rules of free trade which the United States had
been advocating for decades. Such intransigence on an ineffective trade
policy and disrespect for the world trade system may jeopardize the U.S.
agenda in the remainder of the Doha Round negotiations. Repealing the
Byrd Amendment will serve to reduce costs for consumers, promote
exports, and benefit the overall economy. It also reinforces the U.S.
commitment to trade liberalization and strengthens its leadership in the
world trade industry. In this sense, if persuaded by the above arguments,
the defeat of the United States before the WTO's Appellate Body can turn
out to be a victory for both the United States and the world's free trade
system.

160. A recently released study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) shows that
the Byrd Amendment has provided windfall subsidies to only a handful of large corporations while
other U.S. companies are paying the price; and the subsidies are distributed to just a few industries.
See GAO, ISSUES AND EFFECTs OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET
ACT, GAO-05-979, Sept. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05979.pdf.
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